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This paper uses Australia’s automated processes to 
identify and recover social security overpayments as a 
case study to critically analyze the role of algorithms in 
government and public administration. The paper 
analyzes the algorithm in terms of: its performance with 
respect to its purpose; its role in public administration 
processes and principles; its impact on citizen-service 
users; and its role in politics. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of policy and public administrative principles 
that can be adopted for public sector governance and 
accountability with government by algorithm. 
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1  Introduction  
 
“Automated data matching systems governed by flawed 
algorithms are immensely problematic: the Coalition 
[government] needs to take responsibility for the deeply 
flawed IT projects it unleashes on the public.” (Asher Wolf 
quoted in Hunter 2017) 
 
In the lead up to Christmas 2016 and into the New Year, 
several media outlets published a series of exposés about 
Australia’s social security delivery agency, Centrelink, 
automated issuance of about 20,000 ‘debt’ letters a week to 
current and former clients. These letters had been 
automatically issued to people following “discrepancies” 
algorithmically found in data-matching income data held by 
Centrelink with that held by the Australian Tax Office 
(ATO). The letters asked individuals to log into their 
government account and confirm or correct their income for 
the financial year in question, their response was then used 
to algorithmically determine if a debt was owed, and then 
automated recovery processes, either by withholding social 
security benefits or by referring the matter to private debt 
collectors, with an automatic ten percent debt collection 
charge added to the alleged debt (Pett & Cosier 2017). 
 
This media coverage was not driven by a fascination of 
government’s use of automation in new ways, but by a 
concern of its effects on many vulnerable Australians and of 
what seemed to be an error-riddled, unaccountable and 
politically-driven process. 
 
Dubbed ‘Robodebt’, this case study of government by 
algorithm demonstrates the urgent need for a critical 
analysis of algorithms that interrogates both the socio-
technical design and development of algorithms, as well as 
the socio-organizational location of their operation. From a 
government practitioner perspective, Robodebt 
demonstrates the need for governments’ development and 
use of algorithms to be acutely aware of the social-
embeddedness of their use – that algorithms interface with 
complex social circumstances that are not readily encoded – 
and not just to think of algorithms as a technical challenge 
of algorithmic design for administrative efficiency.  
 
By carefully engaging with the various dimensions of 
Robodebt – including misunderstandings in law, 
miscommunications, breaches of procedural justice, 
dismissive Ministers and civil servants, and suicide, this 
paper draws out the various dimensions and dynamics of a 
critical sociology of algorithms. It also explicates the 
practical implications and practitioner principles for 
designing government by algorithm that add public value 
and avoid private misery. 
 
2  Unpacking the Robodebt 
phenomenon  
 
Analyzing government by algorithm is tricky because of 
limited awareness of an algorithm’s presence, the highly 
technical and complex nature of algorithms that are often 
impenetrable ‘black boxes’, and government sensitivity 
around administrative processes, particularly when 
algorithms are developed and operated by third party 
contractors. Accordingly, government by algorithm can 
typically only be analyzed by their reported effects and by 
abstract accounts of what government and others say about 
them. 
 
Accordingly, this paper draws extensively on publicly 
reported accounts of Robodebt’s operation and effects, 
Australian Senate and Commonwealth Ombudsman 
inquiries into the matter (Australia 2017; Ombudsman 
2017), and my personal knowledge of Centrelink’s 
administrative, legal and ICT settings based on two decades 
of both research and in that domain. 
 
The ensuing analysis focuses of four separate domains of 
government by algorithm. The first domain considers 
whether the Robodebt algorithm performed according to its 
purpose or technical specifications. The second domain 
examines how the operation of the Robodebt algorithm 
reconfigured administrative practices including its encoding 
of different processes and principles. Thirdly, the effects of 
Robodebt on citizen-service users is studied. Finally, the 
politics of Robodebt is observed. 
2.1  Algorithmic performance 
An obvious place to begin an analysis is with the algorithm 
qua algorithm. What does it do and does it do what it is 
intended to do? The implicit purpose of ‘Robodebt’ system 
was to automate the: 
a) identification of disparities in personal income data held 
in Australia’s taxation and social security systems that 
could indicate an individual had received more social 
security benefits to which they were entitled; 
b) communication of such disparities to individuals to seek 
their input to confirm or correct their income; and  
c) consequent debt recovery process. For current 
Centrelink clients recovery involved automatically 
withholding a proportion of fortnightly benefits, whereas 
for past clients identified ‘debt’ was allocated and on 
sold to private debt collectors to obtain. 
To be sure, Robodebt is more than one algorithm, but an 
automated system that involved input from Centrelink 
clients, a system akin to Bovens and  Zouridis’ (2002) 
concept of ‘system level bureaucracy’. While several 
elements in this process had been previously automated 
(Henman 1997), there was also considerable human 
involvement by government officials and had not been 
joined-up. With ‘Robodebt’, once the algorithm started, the 
chain of events operated without input from government 
officials. 
 
Did the Robodebt algorithm perform as intended, or as 
publicly described? Based on media reports and an 
understanding of the Social Security Act, the short answer is 
‘no’. In short, individuals who had correctly reported their 
income to both Centrelink and the ATO, and had their 
entitlements appropriately assessed on that information, 
subsequently had debts raised by the Robodebt system. 
Failure of the Robodebt algorithm to correctly deduce 
overpayments using income data (phase (a) above) is 
evident in at least two ways.  
In some cases the name of the employer organization was 
listed differently in the ATO and Centrelink databases, yet 
were the same employer (Pett & Cosier 2017). This may 
have been due to differences in publicly recognized names 
reported by Centrelink clients to Centrelink, compared to 
formally registered business names reported to ATO by 
businesses. In such cases, the client had accurately reported 
income, but Robodebt concluded that the individual had 
exactly double the income than they had declared; the same 
income from two employers which were in fact the one. A 
more sophisticated algorithm could have been designed to 
detect that the two different names were the same 
organization.  
 
In other cases the Robodebt algorithm failed to correctly 
apply the definition of income to assess eligibility as defined 
in the Social Security Act. Eligibility for and payment levels 
of several income support benefits (including the 
unemployment benefit Newstart and Parenting Payment) is 
based on an individual’s fortnightly income in order to 
provide assistance at periods of no or minimal income, 
whereas income in the tax office as annual. Robodebt turned 
the annual income from the ATO into an average fortnightly 
income and applied this to the benefit income test (Pett & 
Cosier 2017; Purtill 2016). This annualized application of 
income in many cases is erroneous and does not represent 
the actual fortnightly income for most recipients who have 
fluctuating incomes and periods on and off benefits. 
Robodebt used this averaged fortnightly income to conclude 
that some individuals were being paid benefits at times 
during the year at a rate higher than the benefit payable. In 
short, the algorithm failed to correctly apply the law. 
 
In both two cases, debts for alleged overpayments were 
raised when under the Social Security Act recipients had 
received exactly what they had been entitled to receive. (A 
later Ombudsman report stated that the algorithm worked 
correctly with appropriate data, but substituted averages for 
missing data (2017: 1)). 
2.2  Algorithmic administration 
Algorithms typically automate pre-existing administrative 
practices undertaken by other means including humans and 
paper forms. Such automation has effects. Algorithms 
change administrative processes, be it speeding them up, 
reducing ambiguity, increasing consistency, and removing 
(some) humans from the process. They can also enable new 
forms of administration possible (Henman 1997; 2010) and 
disrupt administrative principles (c.f. Henman 2005). These 
dynamics were evident in the Robodebt debacle in several 
ways. 
 
One, human Centrelink officers were removed. Prior to 
Robodebt, outcomes of data-matching suggestive of 
possible ‘overpayment’ were reviewed by Centrelink 
officers for checking. With Robodebt, not only did human 
checking of possible ‘overpayments’ cease, but Centrelink 
officers were directed to not intervene to halt Robodebt 
procedures even when human officers suspected the 
algorithm had incorrectly raised a debt (Knaus 2017a). This 
extraordinary (non-)intervention fundamentally breached 
public administrative principles of good administration and 
public governance.  
 
Centrelink officers in walk-in offices and telecall centres 
were also directed not to engage with clients who sought to 
challenge their debts, but direct the clients to the online 
system to contest their alleged debt, even when that system 
would not work for clients (McGrath 2017b). At its best, this 
practice constitutes poor public service delivery. 
 
Two, Robodebt dramatically narrowed the scope, nature and 
substance of client-Centrelink interaction. In addition to 
removing Centrelink officers from the process, clients could 
only engage in very limited ways with Robodebt notices.  In 
the initial directive for clients to confirm, correct or contest 
their income, clients’ responses were limited and processes 
complex and hard to understand. The ability of clients to 
lodge an appeal to an alleged debt was also heavily 
constrained; it had to be done online through a newly 
constructed webpage that was reported to have been 
inoperable at times and very difficult to follow when 
operable (Senate 2017: 110). Clients were not able to lodge 
it with human Centrelink officiers. Clients were thus 
configured by Robodebt in limited ways (c.f. Woolgar 
1990). As evidenced by Robodebt, algorithms define the 
modes of interaction and scope of acceptable input, and in 
doing so, constrain the types and data formats of responses.  
 
Three, Robodebt reversed the legal principle of innocent 
until proven guilty in several ways. Once an income 
discrepancy was observed and a letter was sent to a client to 
confirm, correct or explain the discrepancy, clients had 21 
days to respond. In the case of no response, the Robodebt 
system automatically assumed the algorithm’s calculations 
were correct and automatically raised a debt, which was 
automatically garnished from future social security 
payments (for ongoing clients) and automatically sent and 
on sold to private debt collectors in the case of former clients 
(Ombudsman 2017: 1-2). This occurred when the address to 
which letters were sent were out of date (which DHS 
acknowledged occurred in more than 6,500 of the 217,403 
notices issued to March 2017) (Knaus 2017b) and when 
clients, for various reasons, were unable to respond in the 
time frame (Senate 2017: 111). Debt collection procedures 
also started in cases when clients contested the validity of 
the debt. The assumption of guilt was also evident in the 
automatic application of a 10 per cent debt collection 
surcharge for cases where clients had not responded or who 
did not provide a ‘reasonable excuse’ for the income 
disparity via the highly constrained online reporting tool 
(Senate 2017: 110). Under Social Security Law the ten per 
cent loading can be applied to uncooperative clients, but the 
Robodebt algorithm assumed clients ‘uncooperative’ until 
proven otherwise. 
 
Four, Robodebt reversed “a basic legal principle that in 
order to claim a debt, a debt must be proven to be owed” 
(Senate 2017: 109). In other words, Robodebt reversed the 
onus of prove of debt from Centrelink to the client. Clients 
had to verify income as far back as six years (even when 
Centrelink advises that evidence of income only needs to be 
held for six months, and the Australian tax system requires 
evidence for five years). Moreover, even when Centrelink 
itself held copies of evidence providing income data, this 
was ignored by Robodebt, was not allowed to be included in 
the process by human operators (Knaus 2017b), and was 
reportedly declined to clients who sought to obtain that 
evidence from their personal Centrelink files. In short, 
Robodebt required clients to prove they did not have debt to 
Centrelink, even when Centrelink had the evidence such a 
debt did not exist. 
 
Five, Robodebt radically restricted information disclosure. 
This is evidenced in the just mentioned practice of not 
providing clients with their own evidenced previously 
provided to Centrelink. More significantly, Robodebt 
processes provided no explanation of how alleged debts 
were calculated (Ombudsman 2017: 2). People were simply 
told they had a debt, without explanation. Nor were people 
(clearly) told that the calculated debt could be erroneous or 
how they could contest it. 
 
The foregoing discussion demonstrates how Robodebt 
destabilized administrative processes, procedures and 
principles in reducing administrative discretion, removing 
human intervention, curtailing transparency and information 
provision, assuming guilty until proven innocent, and 
reversing the burden of proof. Indeed, Robodebt 
algorithmically encoded a “fundamental lack of procedural 
fairness” throughout its various procedures (Senate 2017: 
107; Ombudsman 2017). These observations highlight that 
algorithms do not simply reproduce less or non-automated 
administration in an equivalent fashion; they can 
fundamentally recast administrative principles, as Henman 
(2005) previously observed in the increasing use of 
administrative profiling and targeting policy and services.  
2.3  Algorithmic effects 
Robodebt not only algorithmically reconstituted 
Centrelink’s administrative practices, procedures and 
principles, its operation had profound effects on current and 
former Centrelink clients, who by definition were at some 
time highly financially disadvantaged, many who are 
multiply disadvantaged and some highly vulnerable. Indeed, 
Centrelink clients are more likely to be less educated, have 
a disability, chronic or mental health condition. 
 
The negative social, health and financial effects of Robodebt 
were considerable (Butler 2017; Senate 2017). People paid 
debts that they did not owe (Senate 2017: 111). Many people 
reported repayments being enforced or coerced. The Senate 
inquiry reported that  
“In many cases, these enforced debt payments meant the 
person could no longer pay for basic necessities, such as 
travel or food for their children. In other cases, individuals 
felt coerced to pay off debts using their credit card, 
resulting in payments of both debt recovery fees as well 
as credit card interest rates” (2017: 112). 
Disadvantaged people were pushed further into a spiral of 
disadvantage. 
 
Front-line Centrelink staff anonymously reported to the 
media that all the clients contacting them about Robodebt 
letters had been “extremely anxious, fearful, confused and 
frustrated” (McGrath 2017b). This was entirely predictable, 
and even more so for ‘vulnerable’ clients suffering from 
homelessness, domestic violence or mental health. In at least 
one case, this stress allegedly led to suicide (Hunter 2016; 
McKenzie-Murray 2017). Despite Centrelink recording 
certain clients as ‘vulnerable’ and requiring particular care 
when dealing with them, this was ignored by Robodebt (it 
was fixed in later updates of the system), Robodebt applied 
the same processes. As the deceased’s mother aptly 
summarized: “He’s always had mental health issues, and 
they were aware of that. The algorithm did not pick up on 
that.” (ibid, emphasis added). 
2.4  Algorithmic politics 
Algorithms do not exist in a vacuum. Their location within 
the technical, computer world is intimately enmeshed with 
the social world (c.f. Bijker 1997; Latour 2005). Robodebt 
was created as an administrative technology, seemingly 
bereft of politics, but its operation quickly led it to enter the 
world of politics (c.f. Henman 1997; Winner 1980) and in 
doing so it became clear that it was birthed in politics. 
 
Once Robodebt began being reported in the mass media in 
late 2016, it became political. The reports provided 
sufficient evidence to cause political concern that Robodebt 
was both not achieving and overreaching its assumed 
objective to identify and recover overpayments from current 
and former Centrelink clients based on under-reporting of 
income to Centrelink (compared to the taxation office). The 
algorithm appeared to be making mistakes. Apart from 
making mistakes, the Robodebt process of identification and 
recovery of debt appeared to depart from standard 
Centrelink procedures and do so in a way that was 
inconsistent with good public administration and 
governance. 
 
The operation of the system concerned journalists, welfare-
related non-government organizations and opposition 
politicians (Belot 2017a). Australia’s peak welfare body, the 
Australian Council of Social Services (ACOSS) made 
several public statements calling for investigations and 
cessation of the Robodebt program until apparent problems 
could be fixed (ACOSS 2017a; 2017b). Meanwhile, the 
network of welfare rights Community Legal Centres quickly 
prepared facts sheets to provide assistance for people 
receiving such notices. The online political movement 
GetUp! built an online tool, www.fraudstop.com.au, to 
make it easier for people to lodge an appeal to an alleged 
debt, and a separate www.notmydebt.com.au website was 
created to collect stories of those affected by Robodebt. 
There was also discussion of a class legal action. 
 
Politicians and others referred the matter for investigation 
by the independent Commonwealth Ombudsman (2017), 
the Australian National Audit Office (who declined an 
investigation citing the Ombudsman’s investigation), and 
the Senate’s Community Affairs Reference Committee 
(2017). The Ombudsman reported in April 2017, and the 
June 2017 report of the Senate Committee included a 
dissenting report by government Senators. 
 
The politicization of Robodebt was exacerbated by the 
Government’s initial non-response and then dismissive 
response to the concerns raised. Alan Tudge, the Minister 
for Human Services with responsibility for Centrelink, 
rejected reports that the system was flawed, saying in 
January 2017 that “The system is working and we will 
continue with that system” (Anderson & Belot 2017). His 
response also demonstrated his lack of knowledge of his 
portfolio; his advice to affected clients contradicting 
Centrelink’s processes (ibid). A similar politicalizing 
response came from the civil service. The head of the 
Department of Human Services, Kathryn Campbell, sought 
to blame clients for the problems arising from the Robodebt 
system, and refused to meet with the welfare peak body 
ACOSS and the staff union (Knaus 2017b). Journalist’s 
Freedom of Information requests for documents relating to 
the system were rejected on what appeared to be spurious 
grounds (McGhee 2017). While Centrelink officers were 
warned of possible criminal offences in leaking internal 
communications and information about the system 
(McGrath 2017a), Centrelink itself publicly released 
personal information about some client cases who had 
publicly complained about their treatment in the debt 
identification and recovery process in order to ‘correct the 
public record’ (Belot 2017b). Centrelink staff also went on 
strike to protest rising and unsustainable workloads 
exacerbated by Robodebt (Belot 2017c). 
 
While the extreme partisanship, that seems most de rigueur 
in contemporary politics, provides an explanation for the 
government’s reactive, high-stakes response, it is also 
necessary to understand that Robodebt was a techno-
political design at its genesis. It was a major budget-
announced savings initiative to reduce government debt that 
itself had been demonized by the government when in 
opposition. 
 
Robodebt was born as a political actor, but clothed in 
technical efficiency and objectivity. It was a guise to 
redesign the administrative principles by which Centrelink 
operates and enact an abuse of power by a sovereign state 
over its most vulnerable citizens. 
 
3  Discussion and Conclusion 
Robodebt is a breathtaking example of government by 
algorithm in its audacious system-level automation, its 
encoded disruption of administrative principles, and the 
politicization it generated. It also provides considerable 
lessons both for critical analysis of government by algorithm 
and for the development of good practice as algorithmic 
government expands. 
 
In advancing the critical analysis of government by 
algorithm, and for a wider sociology of algorithms, a 
number of positional elements need consideration. 
 
One, algorithms are socio-technical artefacts; they are both 
technical and social. This means that in addition to 
understanding and analyzing the technical constitution and 
operation of algorithms, it is also essential to understand and 
analyze their social formation and operation. Although it is 
difficult to untangle the technical an social elements, on the 
first ledger key considerations involve questions of whether 
the algorithm performs to specifications, is efficient, cost 
effective and robust, what are the risks of it not working 
properly, and how amenable to system change and redesign 
it is. This side of the ledger could also include whether the 
algorithm meets legislated or required standards such as 
privacy and data protection, usability and accessibility (e.g. 
for disability and digital literacy), and at what level of 
performance.  
 
On the social ledger, analysis needs to consider the purposes 
for the algorithm, and reasons it is created and what its use 
is seeking to achieve beyond its technical performance. For 
example, Robodebt was created as a way to substantially 
increase the identification and recovery of overpayments 
(involving increased revenue) and also to reduce operating 
costs. The analysis should also look at the role of the 
algorithm in its social context, including organizational 
processes and how users are configured to interact with it. It 
involves considering if the algorithm requires, enacts or 
assumes different organizational processes than heretofore. 
A social analysis of algorithms will also examine their 
symbolic performance and its social effects. For example, 
are they perceived as unquestionably correct that silences 
doubt, as in Little Britain’s ‘the computer says “no”’?  
 
Sitting within the socio-technical space is a need to analyze 
the nature and assumption of data encoded in variables, 
collected and calculated (Henman 1995). What categories 
are created (c.f. Bowker & Starr 2000)? What data is 
collected and what is overlooked? What are the assumptions 
of the data (e.g. annual or fortnightly income)? 
 
Two, algorithms do not simply automate previous 
processes. They are not simply one type of operational 
technology replacing another; not like with like. They are 
not functionally equivalent, even if they are superficially. 
Algorithms have effects (c.f. Henman 1996). 
 
There are, however, fundamental challenges to critical 
analysis of government by algorithms, notably relating to 
the black boxed nature of algorithms themselves, but also of 
government processes in which they operate. In addition, 
understanding the lived experiences of algorithms’ effects 
may require an ethnographic approach to capture the nuance 
and depth of the complex dynamics involved, a 
methodology that is research and resource intensive. 
 
The above observations point to a few preliminary 
considerations for practitioners in building and engaging 
with government by algorithm. As with all computer system 
development, algorithms require a robust understanding of 
the social context of work and citizen users in which 
algorithms will be deployed. This is always necessary for 
success. But it is also necessary to identify changes in 
organizational or social processes that may fundamentally 
recast administrative principles and rights enacted by 
government by algorithm. 
 
An implication is that just as privacy and data protection 
rights have been developed over the decades in response to 
computerization, new citizen rights need to be considered. 
In the case of Robodebt, it is clear that administrative rights 
of natural justice and due process were not protected, and 
even the government’s conduct was exempt from consumer 
debt protections (Senate 2017: 112).  
 
A new administrative requirement to ensure accountability 
could be enacted that necessitates the use of government by 
algorithm be accompanied with clear publicly- available 
documentation (such as flow charts and database 
specifications) about the algorithm’s operation, its purpose, 
assumptions and data sets/variables. Or at the very least 
ensure access to commented high level code for scrutiny 
(c.f. Henman 2002). 
 
While government by algorithm is arguably new in 
academic and popular awareness, computer algorithms have 
long been operating to automate and extent the role, reach 
and conduct of government. As algorithms become 
increasing complex and nuanced, so too does their critical 
investigation. 
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